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Kondratieff Waves  
in the Global Studies Perspective* 
 
Andrey V. Korotayev and Leonid E. Grinin 
 
 
The analysis of long economic cycles allows us to understand long-term world-
system dynamics, to develop forecasts, to explain crises of the past, as well as the 
current global economic crisis. The article offers a historical sketch of research 
on K-waves; it analyzes the nature of Kondratieff waves that are considered as  
a special form of cyclical dynamics that emerged in the industrial period of the 
World System history. It offers a historical and theoretical analysis of K-wave 
dynamics in the World System framework; in particular, it studies the influence 
of the long wave dynamics on the changes of the world GDP growth rates during 
the last two centuries. Special attention is paid to the interaction between Kon-
dratieff waves and Juglar cycles. The article is based on substantial statistical da-
ta, it extensively employs quantitative analysis, contains numerous tables and dia-
grams. On the basis of the proposed analysis it offers some forecasts of the world 
economic development in the next two decades.  
The article concludes with a section that presents a hypothesis that the 
change of K-wave upswing and downswing phases correlates significantly with 
the phases of fluctuations in the relationships between the World-System Core 
and Periphery, as well as with the World System Core changes. 
Keywords: cyclical dynamics, Juglar cycles, Kondratieff waves, K-waves, World 
System, long waves, phases of long waves, world economy, Nikolay Kondratieff, 
world GDP, technological innovation, core and periphery, leading sector, tech-
nological system, technological style. 
Qualitative movement toward new unknown forms and levels cannot proceed infinitely, 
linearly and unhindered. There are always certain limitations; such movement is accompa-
nied by the emergence of disproportions, growth of competition for resources, and so on. 
On the other hand, continuous human effort to overcome environmental resistance to 
such movement has created conditions for the continuous emergence of more and more 
complex and effective structures at the level of both individual societies and the World 
System as a whole. However, relatively short periods of fast development alternated 
with periods of stagnation, crisis, and sometimes even collapse. This was one of the 
main causes that led to the formation of cyclical components of social macrodynamics 
that in pre-industrial epoch could include cycles with many different periods, including 
secular and even millennial ones (e.g., Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006; Koro-
tayev and Khaltourina 2006; Turchin 2003, 2005a, 2005b; Nefedov 2004; Turchin and 
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Globalistics and Globalization Studies 66 
Nefedov 2009; Turchin and Korotayev 2006; Korotayev et al. 2010; Grinin and Koro-
tayev 2012).  
In the industrial period we see the emergence of new cyclical components including 
Juglar cycles1 with a characteristic period between 7 and 11 years that manifest themselves 
in energetic booms and crises that suddenly engulf social systems. Note that those cycles 
are intrinsic components of the developmental dynamics of such societies. However, they 
are not the only cycles that are characteristic for the industrial and postindustrial systems, 
whereas one of the most interesting aspects of their cyclical dynamics is represented by 
cycles with a characteristic period of 40 to 60 years known as Kondratieff waves (or just  
K-waves).  
The analysis of long economic cycles allows analysts to comprehend the long-term 
dynamics of the World System development, and helps to develop forecasts; it also facili-
tates our understanding of the crises of the past, as well as the current global economic cri-
sis. In the present article we will analyze the emergence of K-waves in the World System 
economic dynamics in the nineteenth century and the changes that can be traced in K-wave 
patterns in the twentieth century, but especially after the Second World War. We will also 
analyze the peculiarities of the study of K-waves within the World System scale and will 
demonstrate that an adequate understanding of the nature of the modern K-wave dynamics 
can only be achieved if this phenomenon is studied precisely within this framework. 
Long Waves in the World Economic Dynamics  
In the 1920s, the Russian economist Nikolay Kondratieff observed that the historical re-
cord of some economic indicators then available to him appeared to indicate a cyclic regu-
larity of phases of gradual increases in values of respective indicators followed by phases 
of decline (Kondratieff 1922: ch. 5; 1925, 1926, 1935, 2002); the period of these apparent 
oscillations seemed to him to be around 50 years. He found this pattern with respect to 
such indicators as prices, interest rates, foreign trade, coal and pig iron production (as well 
as some other production indicators) for some major Western economies (first of all Eng-
land, France, and the United States), whereas the long waves in pig iron and coal production 
were claimed to be detected since the 1870s for the world level as well (note that as regards 
the production indices during decline/downswing phases we deal with the slowdown of 
production growth rather than with actual production decline that rarely lasts longer than 
a year or two, whereas during the upswing phase we deal with a general acceleration of the 
production growth in comparison with the preceding downswing/slowdown period [see, 
e.g., Modelski 2001, 2006 who prefers quite logically to designate ‘decline/downswing’ 
phases as ‘phases of take-off’, whereas he designates the upswing phases as ‘high growth 
phases’]).  
Among important Kondratieff predecessors one should mention J. van Gelderen 
(1913), M. A. Bunyatyan (1915), and S. de Wolff (1924). One can also mention William 
Henry Beveridge (better known, perhaps, as Lord Beveridge, the author of the so-called 
Beveridge Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services (1942) that served as the basis 
for the British Welfare State, especially the National Health Service, after the Second 
World War), who discovered a number of cycles in the long-term dynamics of wheat pric-
es, whereas one of those cycles turned to have an average periodicity of 54 years (Beve-
                                                          
1 In addition to short-term Kitchin cycles and medium-term Kuznets swings (see, e.g., Kitchin 1923; Kuznets 1930, 
1958; Abramovitz 1961; Korotayev and Tsirel 2010c).  
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ridge 1921, 1922). Note that Kondratieff at the time of his discovery of long waves was 
unaware of the results of the above mentioned scientists (see, e.g., Kondratieff 1935: 115, 
note 1). 
Kondratieff himself identified the following long waves and their phases (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Long waves and their phases as identified by Kondratieff 
Long wave  
number Long wave phase Dates of the beginning Dates of the end 
A: upswing  The end of the 1780s or be-
ginning of the 1790s 
1810–1817 First 
B: downswing 1810–1817 1844–1851 
A: upswing  1844–1851 1870–1875 Second 
B: downswing 1870–1875 1890–1896 
A: upswing  1890–1896 1914–1920 Third  
B: downswing 1914–1920  
 
The subsequent students of Kondratieff cycles identified additionally the following long-
waves in the post-World War 1 period (see Table 2). 
Table 2. ‘Post-Kondratieff’ long waves and their phases 
Long wave  
number Long wave phase Dates of the beginning Dates of the end 
A: upswing  1890–1896 1914–1920 Third  
B: downswing From 1914 to 1928/29 1939–1950 
A: upswing  1939–1950 1968–1977 Fourth  
B: downswing 1968–1974 1984–1991 
A: upswing  1984–1991 2008–2010? Fifth  
B: downswing 2008–2010? ? 
Sources: Mandel 1980; Dickson 1983; Van Duijn 1983: 155; Wallerstein 1984; Goldstein 1988: 67; 
Modelski and Thompson 1996; Bobrovnikov 2004: 47; Pantin and Lapkin 2006: 283–285, 315; Ayres 
2006; Linstone 2006: fig. 1; Tausch 2006b: 101–104; Thompson 2007: table 5; Jourdon 2008: 1040–
1043. The last date is suggested by the authors of the present paper. It was also suggested earlier by Lynch 
2004; see also Akaev and Sadovnichy 2010; Akaev et al. 2011.  
A considerable number of explanations for the observed Kondratieff wave (or just K-wave 
[Modelski and Thompson 1996; Modelski 2001]) patterns have been proposed. At at the 
initial stage of K-wave research, the respective pattern was detected in the most secure 
way in terms of the price indices (see below). Most explanations proposed during that pe-
riod were monetary, or monetary-oriented. For example, K-waves were connected with the 
inflation shocks caused by major wars (e.g., Åkerman 1932; Bernstein 1940; Silberling 
1943, etc.). In recent decades such explanations became less popular, as the K-wave pat-
tern stopped being traced in the price indices after the Second World War (e.g., Goldstein 
1988: 75; Bobrovnikov 2004: 54).  
Kondratieff himself accounted for the K-wave dynamics first of all on the basis of 
capital investment dynamics (see Kondratieff 1928, 1984; 2002: 387–397). This trend was 
further developed by Jay W. Forrester and his colleagues (see, e.g., Forrester 1978, 1981, 
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1985; Senge 1982, etc.), as well as by A. van der Zwan (1980), Hans Glisman, Horst 
Rodemer, and Frank Wolter (1983), etc.  
However, in the recent decades the most popular explanation of K-wave dynamics was 
the one connecting them with the waves of technological innovations.  
Kondratieff himself noticed that ‘during the recession of the long waves an especially 
large number of important discoveries and inventions in production and communication 
technologies are made, which, however, are usually applied on a large scale only at the 
beginning of the next long upswing’ (Kondratieff 1935: 111, see also, e.g., Idem 2002: 
370–374).  
Schumpeter (1939) used this argument to develop a rather influential ‘cluster-of-
innovation’ version of K-waves theory, according to which, Kondratieff cycles were pre-
dicted primarily due to discontinuous rates of innovation (for more recent developments of 
the Schumpeterian version of K-wave theory see, e.g., Mensch 1979; Dickson 1983; Free-
man 1987; Berry 1991; Tylecote 1992; Glazyev 1993; Maevski 1997; Modelski and Thomp-
son 1996; Modelski 2001, 2006; Devezas and Modelski 2003; Yakovets 2001; Ayres 
2006; Dator 2006; Hirooka 2006; Papenhausen 2008; Perez 2011; for the most recent 
presentation of empirical evidence supporting Schumpeter's cluster-of-innovation hy-
pothesis see Kleinknecht and van der Panne 2006). Within this approach every Kondratieff 
wave is associated with a certain leading sector (or leading sectors), technological system 
or technological style. For example, the third Kondratieff wave is sometimes characterized 
as ‘the age of steel, electricity, and heavy engineering. The fourth wave takes in the age of 
oil, the automobile and mass production. Finally, the current fifth wave is described as the 
age of information and telecommunications (Papenhausen 2008: 789); whereas the forth-
coming sixth wave is sometimes supposed to be connected first of all with nano- and bio-
technologies (e.g., Lynch 2004; Dator 2006).  
There were also a number of attempts to combine capital investment and innovation 
theories of K-waves (e.g., Rostow 1975, 1978; van Duijn 1979, 1981, 1983; Akaev 2010, 
etc.). Of special interest is Devezas – Corredine model based on biological determinants 
(generations and learning rate) and information theory that explains (for the first time) the 
characteristic period (50–60 years) of Kondratieff cycles (Devezas and Corredine 2001, 
2002; see also Devezas, Linstone, and Santos 2005).  
Many social scientists consider Kondratieff waves as a very important component of 
the modern world-system dynamics. As has been phrased by one of the most important  
K-wave students:  
Long waves of economic growth possess a very strong claim to major significance in 
the social processes of the world system… Long waves of technological change, 
roughly 40–60 years in duration, help shape many important processes… They have 
become increasingly influential over the past thousand years. K-waves have become 
especially critical to an understanding of economic growth, wars, and systemic lead-
ership... But they also appear to be important to other processes such as domestic po-
litical change, culture, and generational change. This list may not exhaust the signifi-
cance of Kondratieff waves but it should help establish an argument for the impor-
tance of long waves to the world's set of social processes (Thompson 2007).  
Against this background it appears rather significant that evidence of the very presence of 
the Kondratieff waves in the world dynamics remains rather controversial. The presence  
of K-waves in price dynamics (at least before the Second World War) has a rather wide 
empirical support (see, e.g., Gordon 1978: 24; van Ewijk 1982; Cleary and Hobbs 1983, 
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etc.). However, as has been mentioned above, the K-wave pattern stopped being traced in 
the price indices after the Second World War (e.g., Goldstein 1988: 75; Bobrovnikov 
2004: 54).  
On the other hand, as has already been demonstrated (Scheglov 2009; Grinin, Koro-
tayev, and Tsirel 2011: 75–77), when inflation is taken into account and the price indices are 
expressed in grams of gold rather than in dollars, those indices continue to correlate with the 
K-wave pattern (see Fig. 1). Starting from the early 1970s, energy resources (oil in the first 
place) served as a sort of ‘reserve currency’ comparable with gold, and Kondratieff waves 
started to be traced in the price index dynamics when expressed in oil equivalent (see Fig. 2).  
Fig. 1. The USA producer price index used by Kondratieff and extended up to 2010 in 
the gold equivalent (100 = 1900–10 level) 
 
Sources: Scheglov 2009; Grinin, Korotayev, and Tsirel 2011: 76.  
Fig. 2. The USA producer price index in gold and oil equivalent (100 = 1900–10 level) 
 
Sources: BP 2010; Scheglov 2009; Grinin, Korotayev, and Tsirel 2011: 77. 
 
Kondratieff 
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Regarding long waves in production dynamics we will restrict ourselves to analyzing evi-
dence for the presence of K-waves in the world production indices. As Kondratieff waves 
tend to be considered an important component of the world-system social and economic 
dynamics, one would expect to detect them in terms of the major world macroeconomic 
indicators; first of all with respect to the world GDP dynamics (Chase-Dunn and Grimes 
1995: 405–411). However, until now the attempts to detect them in the dynamics of the-
world GDP (or similar indicators) have brought controversial results.  
Kondratieff himself claimed to have detected long waves in the dynamics of world 
production of coal and pig iron (e.g., Kondratieff 1935: 109–110). However, his evidence 
of the presence of long waves in these series (as well as in all the production dynamics 
series on national levels) was criticized most sharply: 
Foremost among the methodological criticisms have been those directed against 
Kondratieff's use of trend curves. Kondratieff's method is first to fit a long-term trend 
to a series and then to use moving averages to bring out long waves in the residuals 
(the fluctuations around the trend curve). 
But ‘when he eliminated the trend, Kondratieff failed to formulate clearly what the 
trend stands for’ (Garvy 1943: 209). The equations Kondratieff uses for these long-term 
trend curves… include rather elaborate (often cubic) functions.2 This casts doubt on the 
theoretical meaning and parsimony of the resulting long waves, which cannot be seen as 
simple variations in production growth rates (Goldstein 1988: 82; see also, e.g., Barr 1979: 
704; Eklund 1980: 398–399, etc.). 
However, quite a few scientists presented later new evidence supporting the presence 
of long waves in the dynamics of the world economic indicators. For example, Mandel 
(1975: 141; 1980: 3) demonstrated that, in full accordance with Kondratieff's theory, be-
tween 1820 and 1967 during Phases A of K-cycles the annual compound growth rates in 
world trade were on average significantly higher than in adjacent Phases B. David 
M. Gordon (1978: 24) got similar results with respect to world per capita production for 
1865–1938 based on world production data from Dupriez (1947: 567), world industrial dy-
namics (for 1830–1980) taken from Thomas Kuczynski (1982: 28), and average growth rates 
of the world economy (Kuczynski 1978: 86) for 1850–1977; similar results were obtained by 
Joshua Goldstein (1988: 211–217).  
Of special interest are the works by Marchetti and his co-workers at the International 
Institute for Advanced System Analysis who have shown extensively the evidence of K-waves 
using physical indicators, as for instance energy consumption, transportation systems dy-
namics, etc. (Marchetti 1980, 1986, 1988, etc.). Arno Tausch claims to have detected  
K-waves in the world industrial production growth rates dynamics using polynomial re-
gression methods (Tausch 2006a: 167–190). However, empirical tests produced by a few 
other scholars failed to support the hypothesis of presence of the K-waves in the world 
production dynamics (see, e.g., van der Zwan 1980: 192–197; Chase-Dunn and Grimes 
1995: 407–409, reporting the results of Peter Grimes' research).  
There were a few attempts to apply spectral analysis in order to detect the presence of 
K-waves in the world production dynamics. Thomas Kuczynski (1978) applied spectral 
analysis in order to detect K-waves in world agricultural production, total exports, inven-
tions, innovations, industrial production, and total production for the period between 1850 
                                                          
2 For example, for the trend of English lead production the function used by Kondratieff looks as follows: y =  
= 10^(0.0278 – 0.0166x – 0.00012x^2).  
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and 1976. Though Kuczynski suggests that his results ‘seem to corroborate’ the K-wave 
hypothesis, he himself does not find this support decisive and admits that ‘we cannot ex-
clude the possibility that the 60-year-cycle… is a random cycle’ (Kuczynski 1978: 81–82); 
note that Kuczynski did not make any formal test of statistic significance of the K-waves 
tentatively identified by his spectral analysis. K-waves were also claimed to have been 
found with spectral analysis by Rainer Metz (1992) both in GDP production series on 
eight European countries (for the 1850–1979 period) and in the world production index 
developed by Hans Bieshaar and Alfred Kleinknecht (1984) for 1780–1979; however, later 
he denounced those findings (Metz 1998, 2006).  
A few scientists using spectral analysis have failed to detect K-waves in production 
series on national levels of quite a few countries (e.g., van Ewijk 1982; Metz 1998, 2006; 
Diebolt and Doliger 2006).  
Against this background we (together with Sergey Tsirel) have found it appropriate to 
check the presence of K-waves in the world GDP dynamics using the most recent datasets 
on this variable dynamics covering the period between 1870 and 2007 (Maddison 1995, 
2001, 2003, 2009; World Bank 2012) and applying an upgraded methodology for the es-
timation of statistical significance of detected waves (see, e.g., Korotayev and Tsirel 
2010a, 2010b, 2010c; Grinin, Korotayev, and Tsirel 2011); it is worth emphasizing that 
our analysis made it possible for the first time to estimate statistical significance of the 
Kondratieff waves in the world GDP dynamics, as will be demonstrated in the following 
sections.  
Kondratieff Waves in the Post-Second World War GDP Data  
Note that the Kondratieff-wave component can be seen quite clearly in the post-World 
War II dynamics of the world GDP growth rates even directly, without application of any 
special statistical techniques (see Fig. 3):3 
Fig. 3. Dynamics of the annual world GDP growth rates (%), 1945–2007; 1945 
point corresponds to the average annual growth rate in the 1940s. Initial 
series: Maddison/World Bank empirical estimates 
 
                                                          
3 Note that K-waves (as well as Juglar cycles) are also quite visible for recent decades in the world dynamics of such 
important macroeconomic variables as the world gross fixed capital formation (as % of GDP) and the investment ef-
fectiveness (it indicates how many dollars of the world GDP growth is achieved with one dollar investments) – see 
Appendix, Figs S1 and S2. The dynamics of both variables are connected to the world GDP dynamics. Actually, the 
world GDP dynamics is determined to a considerable extent by the dynamics of those two variables.  
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However, the Kondratieff wave component becomes especially visible if a LOWESS 
(= LOcally WEighted Scatterplot Smoothing) line is fitted (see Fig. 4). 
Fig. 4. Maddison/World Bank empirical estimates with fitted LOWESS line. Kernel: 
Triweight. % of points to fit: 50 
 
As can be seen, Figs 3–4 indicate:  
1) that the Kondratieff-wave pattern can be detected up to the present in a surprisingly 
intact form (though, possibly, with a certain shortening of its period, suggested by a few 
authors [see, e.g., van der Zwan 1980; Bobrovnikov 2004; Tausch 2006a; Pantin and Lap-
kin 2006]);  
2) that the present world financial-economic crisis might really mark the beginning of 
a new Kondratieff Phase B (downswing). Indeed, consider the post-World War II dynamics 
of the world GDP growth rates taking into account the two years, 2008 and 2009 (using the 
World Bank forecast figure for the year 2012) (see Fig. 5).  
As we see, according to its magnitude the current financial-economic crisis does not 
appear to resemble a usual crisis marking the end of a Juglar cycle amidst an upswing 
phase (or a downswing) of a Kondratieff cycle (which one would expect with the second 
interpretation). Instead it resembles particularly deep crises (similar to the ones of 1973–
1974, 1929–1933, mid-1870s or mid-1820s) that are found just at the border of Phases A 
and B of the K-waves (see, e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 2010).  
Fig. 5. Dynamics of the Annual world GDP Growth Rates (%), 1945–2011  
 
Sources: World Bank 2011: NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.KD; Maddison 2010; Conference Board 2011.  
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Kondratieff Waves in the World GDP Data before 1945–1950 
As Fig. 6 shows, for the 1870–1945/50 period the K-wave pattern is not as easily detectable 
as after 1945/50. The turbulent second, third and fourth decades of the twentieth century are 
characterized by enormous magnitude of fluctuations of the world GDP growth rates (not 
observed either in previous or subsequent periods). The lowest (for 1871–2007) figures of 
the world GDP annual rates of change are observed just in these decades (during the Great 
Depression, World Wars I and II as well as immediately after the end of those wars). On 
the other hand, during the mid-20s and mid-30s booms the world GDP annual growth rates 
achieved historical maximums (they were only exceeded during the K-wave 4, Phase A, in 
the 1950s and 1960s, and were generally higher than during both the pre-World War I and 
recent [1990s and 2000s] upswings). This, of course, complicates the detection of the 
long-wave pattern during those decades.  
Fig. 6. Dynamics of the World GDP Annual Growth Rates (%), 1871–2007  
 
Source: Korotayev and Tsirel 2010c: 6.  
 
Actually, this pattern is somehow better visible in the diagrams for 5-year moving average, 
and, especially, for simple 5-year averages (see Figs 7 and 8).  
Fig. 7. Dynamics of the world GDP annual growth rates (%), moving 5-year aver-
ages, 1871–2007  
 
Sources: World Bank 2012; Maddison 2009. 
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Note: 1873 point corresponds to the average annual growth rate in 1871–1875, 1874 to 1872–1876, 1875 to 
1873–1877… 2005 to 2003–2007; 2006 and 2007 points correspond to the annual growth rates in years 
2006 and 2007 respectively.  
Fig. 8. Dynamics of the world GDP annual growth rates (%), 5-year averages, 1871–
2007 
 
Sources: World Bank 2012; Maddison 2009. 
The application of the LOWESS technique reveals a certain K-wave pattern in the pre-
1950 series (see Fig. 9).  
Fig. 9. World GDP annual growth rate dynamics (1870–1946): Maddison empirical 
estimates with fitted LOWESS line  
 
Note: Maddison-based empirical estimates with fitted LOWESS line. Kernel: Triweight. % of points to 
fit: 40.  
In fact, the LOWESS technique reveals quite clearly the K-wave pattern prior to World 
War I (in the period corresponding to Phase B of the 2nd Kondratieff wave and major part 
of Phase A of the 3rd wave) (see Fig. 10). 
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Fig. 10. World GDP annual growth rate dynamics: Maddison-based empirical esti-
mates with fitted LOWESS line. Phase B (Downswing) of the 2nd Kon-
dratieff Wave and Phase A (Upswing) of the 3rd Wave, 1871–1913  
 
Note: Maddison-based empirical estimates with fitted LOWESS line. Kernel: Triweight. % of points to 
fit: 50.  
However, the 3rd K-wave (apparently strongly deformed by World War I) looks much less 
accurate (see Fig. 11).  
Phase B of the 3rd Kondratieff cycle presents the main problem as the timing of its 
start remains unclear (1914, or mid-1920s?). Our analysis does not make it possible to 
make the final choice between two options – either K3 Phase B started in 1914 and was 
interrupted by the mid-1920s boom; or K3 Phase A continued till the mid-1920s having 
been interrupted by the WWI bust.  
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Fig. 11. World GDP annual growth rate dynamics: Maddison-based empirical esti-
mates with fitted LOWESS line. The 3rd Kondratieff Wave  
 
Note: Maddison-based empirical estimates with fitted LOWESS line. Kernel: Triweight. % of points to 
fit: 60.  
However, the LOWESS technique produces an especially neat K-wave pattern with the 
second assumption – that is we get it when we omit the WWI influence (see Fig. 12). 
Fig. 12. World GDP annual growth rate dynamics, 5-year averages: Maddison-
based empirical estimates with fitted LOWESS line. 1870–2007, omitting 
World War I influence  
 
Note: Maddison-based empirical estimates with fitted LOWESS line. Kernel: Triweight. % of points to 
fit: 20.  
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This figure reveals rather distinctly double peaks of the upswings. With a stronger smooth-
ing (see Fig. 13) the form of the peaks becomes smoother, whereas the waves themselves 
become more distinct. 
Fig. 13. World GDP annual growth rate dynamics, 5-year moving average: Maddi-
son-based empirical estimates with fitted LOWESS line. 1870–2007, omit-
ting World War I influence  
 
Note: Maddison-based empirical estimates with fitted LOWESS line. Kernel: Triweight. % of points to 
fit: 20. 
Hence, it looks a bit more likely that K3 Phase A lasted till the mid-1920s (having been 
interrupted by WWI). Incidentally, if we take the WWI influence years (1914–1921) out, 
we arrive at a quite reasonable K3 Phase A length – 26 years, even if we take 1929 as  
the end of this phase:  
1929 – 1895 = 34 
34 – 8 = 26 
Note that with the first assumption (K3 Phase B started in 1914 and was interrupted by the 
mid-1920s boom) we would have an excessive length of K3 Phase B – 32 years (that 
would, however, become quite normal, if we take out the mid-1920s boom years).  
Yet, it seems necessary to stress that we find overall additional support for the Kon-
dratieff pattern in the world GDP dynamics data for the 1870–1950 period. First of all, this 
is manifested by the fact that both Phases A of this period have relatively higher rates of 
world GDP growth, whereas both Phases B are characterized by relatively lower rates. 
Note that this holds true without taking out either the World War I, or the 1920s boom 
influence, and irrespective of whatever dating for the beginnings and ends of the relevant 
phases we choose (see Table 3 and Fig. 14). 
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Table 3. Average annual world GDP growth rates (%) during phases A and B of 
Kondratieff waves, 1871–2007 
Years Average annual World GDP growth rates (%) during respective phase 
Kondra-
tieff wave 
number 
Phase 
Version 1 Version 2 Version 1 Version 2 
II End of 
Phase A 
1871–1875 1871–1875 2.09 2.09 
II B 1876–1894 1876–1894 1.68 1.68 
III A 1895–1913 1895–1929 2.57 2.34 
III B 1914–1946 1930–1946 1.50 0.98 
IV A 1947–1973 1947–1973 4.84 4.84 
IV B 1974–1991 1974–1983 3.05 2.88 
V A 1992–2007 1984–2007 3.49 3.42 
Fig. 14. Average annual world GDP growth rates (%) during phases A and B of 
Kondratieff waves, 1871–2007 
 
With different dates for beginnings and ends of various phases we have somehow different 
shapes of long waves, but the overall Kondratieff wave pattern remains intact. Note that the 
difference between the two versions can be partly regarded as a continuation of controversy 
between two approaches (‘the K-wave period is approximately constant in the last centuries’ 
vs. ‘the period of K-waves becomes shorter and shorter’).4 The first approach correlates 
better with the results of the spectral analysis that have been presented above and the op-
timistic forecast, whereas the second approach correlates better with the interpretation of 
the current crisis with the beginning of the downswing phase of the 5th K-wave. 
Kondratieff Waves in the World GDP Dynamics before 1870 
There are some grounds to doubt that Kondratieff waves can be traced back in the world 
GDP dynamics for the pre-1870 period (though for this period they appear to be detected 
for the GDP dynamics of the West).  
Note that for the period between 1700 and 1870, Maddison provides world GDP esti-
mate for one year only – for 1820. What is more, for the period before 1870, Maddison 
does not provide annual (or even per decade) estimates for many major economies, which 
                                                          
4 See, e.g., van der Zwan 1980; Bobrovnikov 2004; Tausch 2006a; Pantin and Lapkin 2006.  
Korotayev and Grinin • Kondratieff Waves and Global Studies 79 
makes it virtually impossible to reconstruct the world GDP annual (or even per decade) 
growth rates for this period. However, it appears possible to reconstruct the world GDP 
estimate for 1850, as for this year Maddison does provide his estimates for all the major 
economies. Thus, it appears possible to estimate the world GDP average annual growth 
rates for 1820–1850 (i.e., the period that more or less coincides with K1 Phase B) and for 
1850–1870/1875 (i.e., K2 Phase A), and, consequently, to make a preliminary test whether 
the Kondratieff wave pattern can be observed for the 1820–1870 period.  
The results look as follows:  
Table 4. Average annual world GDP growth rates (%) during phases A and B of 
Kondratieff waves, 1820–1894 
Years 
Average annual 
world GDP 
growth rates (%) 
during respective 
phase 
Kondra-
tieff wave 
number P
ha
se
 
Version 1 Version 2 Version 1 Version 2
Average annual 
World GDP 
growth rate pre-
dicted by Kon-
dratieff wave 
pattern 
Observed 
I B 1820–
1850 
1820–1850 0.88 0.88   
II A 1851–
1875 
1851–1870 1.26 1.05 To be signifi-
cantly higher than 
during the subse-
quent phase 
Significantly low-
er than during the 
subsequent phase 
II B 1876–
1894 
1871–1894 1.68 1.76 To be signifi-
cantly lower than 
during the subse-
quent phase 
Significantly 
higher than during 
the subsequent 
phase 
Thus, whatever dating of the end of K2 Phase A we choose, we observe a rather strong 
deviation from the K-wave pattern. Indeed, according to this pattern, one would expect 
that in the 1850–1870/5 period (corresponding to Phase A of the 2nd Kondratieff wave) 
the World GDP average annual growth rate should be higher than in the subsequent period 
(corresponding to Phase B of this K-wave). However, the actual situation turns out to be 
quite opposite – in 1870/75–1894 the world GDP average annual growth rate was signifi-
cantly higher than in 1850–1870/75.  
Note, however, that the K-wave pattern still seems to be observed for this period with re-
spect to the GDP dynamics of the West (see Table 5 and Fig. 15).5 
                                                          
5 What is more, this pattern appears to be observed in the socio-economic dynamics of the European-centered world-
system for a few centuries prior to 1820 (see, e.g., Beveridge 1921, 1922; Goldstein 1988; Jourdon 2008; Modelski 
2006; Modelski and Thompson 1996; Pantin and Lapkin 2006; Thompson 2007).  
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Table 5. Average annual world GDP growth rates (%) of the West during phases A 
and B of Kondratieff waves, 1820–1894 
Kondra-
tieff wave 
number 
Phase Years 
Average annual 
world GDP 
growth rates (%) 
during respective 
phase 
Average annual world 
GDP growth rate pre-
dicted by Kondratieff 
wave pattern 
Observed 
I B 1820–
1850 
2.04 To be significantly low-
er than during the sub-
sequent phase 
Significantly lower 
than during the sub-
sequent phase 
II A 1851–
1875 
2.45 To be significantly 
higher than during the 
subsequent phase 
Significantly higher 
than during the sub-
sequent phase 
II B 1876–
1894 
2.16 To be significantly low-
er than during the sub-
sequent phase 
Significantly lower 
than during the sub-
sequent phase 
III A 1895–
1913 
2.94 To be significantly 
higher than during the 
previous phase 
Significantly higher 
than during the pre-
vious phase 
Note: Data are for 12 major West European countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) and four 
‘Western offshoots’ (the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand).  
Fig. 15. Average annual world GDP growth rates (%) of the West during phases A 
and B of Kondratieff waves, 1820–1913  
 
We believe that the fact that K-wave pattern can be traced back in the GDP dynamics of 
the West for the pre-1870 period and that it is not found for the world GDP dynamics is 
not coincidental, and cannot be accounted for just on the basis of the unreliability of the 
world GDP estimates for this period. In fact, it is not surprising that the Western GDP 
growth rates were generally higher in 1851–1875 than in 1876–1894, and the world growth 
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rates were not. The proximate explanation is very simple. The world GDP growth rates in 
1851–1875 were relatively low (in comparison with 1876–1894) mostly due to the enor-
mous economic decline observed in China in 1852–1870 due to social-demographic col-
lapse in connection with the Taiping Rebellion and accompanying events of additional 
episodes of internal warfare, famines, epidemics and so on (Ilyushechkin 1967; Perkins 
1969: 204; Larin 1986; Kuhn 1978; Liu 1978; Nepomnin 2005, etc.) that resulted, for ex-
ample, in the human death toll as high as 118 million human lives (Huang 2002: 528). 
Note that in the mid-nineteenth century China was still a major world economic player, 
and the China's decline of that time affected the world GDP dynamics in a rather signifi-
cant way. According to Maddison's estimates, in 1850 the Chinese GDP was about 
247 billion international dollars (1990, PPP), as compared with about 63 billion in Great 
Britain, or 43 billion in the USA. By 1870, according to Maddison, it declined to less than 
$190 billion, which to a large degree compensated the acceleration of economic growth 
observed in the same years in the West (actually, Maddison appears to underestimate the 
magnitude of the Chinese economic decline in this period, so the actual influence of the 
Chinese 1852–1870 sociodemographic collapse might have been even much more signifi-
cant). K2 Phase A in the Western GDP dynamics started to be felt at the world level only 
in the very end of this phase, in 1871–1875, after the end of the collapse period in China 
and the beginning of the recovery growth in this country.  
In more general terms, it seems possible to maintain that in the pre-1870 epoch the 
Modern World System was not sufficiently integrated, and the World System core was not 
sufficiently strong yet – that is why the rhythm of the Western core's development was not 
quite felt at the world level. Only in the subsequent era does the World System reach such 
a level of integration and its core acquires such strength that it appears possible to trace 
quite securely Kondratieff waves in the world GDP dynamics.6  
Kondratieff Waves in the World Technological Innovation  
Dynamics  
Naturally, the connection between the K-waves and technological innovation processes de-
serves special attention. In order to re-test the Kondratieff – Schumpeter hypothesis for the 
presence of K-waves with regard to the world invention activities, we have used the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Statistics Database on the number of patents 
granted annually in the world per million of the world population in 1900–2008 (see Koro-
tayev, Zinkina, and Bogevolnov 2011 for more details). For 1985–2008 WIPO publishes 
direct data on the total number of patent grants in the world per year (WIPO 2012a). For the 
1900–1985 we calculated this figure by summing up the data for all the countries (that are 
                                                          
6 The fact that K-waves can be traced in Western economic dynamics earlier than at the world level has already been 
noticed by Reuveny and Thompson (2008) who provide the following explanation: if one takes the position that the 
core driver of K-waves is intermittent radical technological growth primarily originating in the system leader's econ-
omy, one would not expect world GDP to mirror K-wave shapes as well as the patterned fluctuations that are found 
in the lead economy and that world GDP might correspond more closely to the lead economy's fluctuations over time 
as the lead economy evolves into a more predominant central motor for the world economy. Reuveny and Thompson 
also argue that to the extent that technology drives long-term economic growth, the main problem (certainly not the 
only one) in diffusing economic growth throughout the system is that the technology spreads unevenly. Most of it 
stays in the already affluent North and the rest fell farther behind the technological frontier. Until recently very little 
trickled down to the global South (Reuveny and Thompson 2001, 2004, 2008, 2009). Our findings also seem to 
match this interpretation.  
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provided by the WIPO in a separate dataset [WIPO 2012b]). We used the databases of 
Maddison (2010), UN Population Division (2012), and U.S. Bureau of the Census (2012) 
as our sources of data on the world population dynamics.  
The results of our calculations are presented in Fig. 16. 
Fig. 16. Dynamics of number of patent grants per year per million of the world 
population, 1900–2008 
 
It is evident that the figure above reveals an unusually distinct K-wave pattern (note that  
a similar pattern has been detected in the dynamics of patent applications by Plakitkin 
[2011] who, however, did not appreciate that he dealt with K-wave dynamics). In general, 
we see rather steady increases in the number of patent grants per million during K-wave 
A-phases (‘upswings’), and we observe its rather pronounced decreases during K-wave  
B-phases (‘downswings’). Thus, the first period of the growth of the variable in question 
revealed by Fig. 16 more or less coincided (with a rather slight, about 2–3 years, lag) with 
A-phase of the 3rd K-wave (1896–1929); it was only interrupted by the First World War 
when the number of patent grants per million experienced a precipitous but rather short 
decline, whereas after the war the value of the variable in question returned as fast to the  
A-phase-specific trend line. The first prolonged period of decline of the number of patent 
grants per million corresponds rather accurately (except for the above mentioned 2–3 year 
lag) to B-phase of this wave (1929–1945); the second period of steady increase in the value 
of the variable in question correlates almost perfectly with A-phase of the 4th K-wave (1945–
1968/74), whereas the second period of decline corresponds rather well to its B-phase 
(1968/74–1984/1991); finally, the latest period of the growth of the number of patent 
grants per million correlates with A-phase of the 5th K-wave.  
Note, however, that this pattern apparently goes counter the logic suggested by Kon-
dratieff, Schumpeter and their followers who expected increases in invention activities dur-
ing B-phases and decreases during A-phases. Yet, this contradiction is only apparent. Indeed, 
as we have mentioned above, Kondratieff maintained that ‘during the recession of the long 
waves, an especially large number of important discoveries and inventions in the tech-
nique of production and communication are made, which, however, are usually applied on 
a large scale only at the beginning of the next long upswing’ (Kondratieff 1935: 111, our 
emphasis).  
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It has been suggested that it is necessary to distinguish between ‘breakthrough’ and 
‘improving’ inventions (e.g., Akaev 2010); breakthrough inventions are those that during  
a B-phase of a given K-wave create foundations for a new technological system corre-
sponding to a new K-wave. As Kondratieff suggested, they find their large-scale applica-
tion during the A-phase of the new K-wave based on this new technological system, which 
is accompanied by a flood of improving innovations that are essential for the diffusion of 
technologies produced by breakthrough inventions made during the B-phase of the preced-
ing K-wave (Ibid.; Hirooka 2006).  
Note that among the total number of patents a negligible proportion has been granted for 
breakthrough inventions, whereas the overwhelming majority of all the inventions is consti-
tuted just by ‘improving’ inventions. The exhaustion of the potential of the given K-wave's 
technological system leads to a decrease of the number of inventions that realize the poten-
tial created by the breakthroughs, which created the respective technological system. On 
the other hand, this very exhaustion of the previous technological system's potential for 
improvement creates powerful stimuli for new breakthrough inventions. However, the in-
crease in the number of breakthrough inventions in no way compensates the dramatic de-
crease of the number of innovations improving the potential of the previous technological 
system. Hence, on the basis of this logic there are theoretical grounds to expect that during 
the B-phases of K-waves the total number of inventions (and patent grants) per million of 
population should decrease, whereas during A-phases we should observe a pronounced 
increase in this number (as some decrease in the number of breakthrough inventions is by 
far compensated by a dramatic increase in the number of improving inventions).  
Therefore, our test has revealed this pattern.  
World System Effects and K-Wave Dynamics  
As has been already mentioned above, the adherents of the world-system approach con-
sider K-waves as one of the most important components of the World System dynamics.  
We quite agree with Thompson (2007) who maintains that K-waves may help to clar-
ify many important points in the World System processes. However, one could also trace 
another kind of logic – the analysis of the World System processes can contribute a lot to the 
clarification of the nature of the Kondratieff waves. We believe that the driving forces of 
the K-waves can be adequately understood if only we take into account the dynamics, phas-
es, and peculiarities of the World-System development. That is why we have tried to analyze 
K-waves on a World-System scale. Such an approach can integrate different points of 
view on the nature of Kondratieff waves.  
Actually, we can consider the following five points:  
1. Kondratieff waves are most relevant when considered at the System scale. As those 
waves always manifest themselves at supra-societal scales, the World System processes 
turn out to be very important for the understanding of the K-wave dynamics. 
2. The expansion and intensification of the World-System economic links lead to the 
formation of preconditions of new upswings. Note that Kondratieff himself noticed that 
‘the new long cycles usually coincide with the expansion of the orbit of the world eco-
nomic ties’ (Kondratieff 2002: 374). We would add that the begining of new cycles im-
plies not only expansion of those ties, but also the change of their nature (we will discuss 
this in more details below). 
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3. The World System processes are bound to influence economic processes (including 
medium period business cycles [e.g., Grinin and Korotayev 2009b]), hence, they are bound 
to influence K-wave dynamics. However, we also observe a reverse influence of those waves 
on World System development (which was actually noticed by Thompson). Kondratieff him-
self noticed the growth in the intensity of warfare and revolutionary activities during K-wave 
upswings (Kondratieff 2002: 373–374). On the other hand, it is quite clear that those proc-
esses themselves influenced K-wave dynamics in a very significant way and world wars 
provide salient illustrations). It is quite clear that those K-wave students who pointed to an 
important role of military expenses (and inflation shocks they produce) identified a signifi-
cant (though in no way sole) cause of price growth (and decline) in the course of Kondratieff 
cycles.  
4. As we have already mentioned above, the breakthrough inventions (producing new 
technological systems) tend to be made during downswings, whereas their wide imple-
mentation is observed during subsequent upswings. The diffusion of those innovations 
throughout the World System significantly affects the course of K-waves, as the opening 
of new zones of economic development can change the world dynamics in general. Thus, 
in Chapter 1 of our monograph on periodic economic crises (Grinin and Korotayev 2009b) 
we paid considerable attention to the point that the vigorous railway construction of the 
last decades of the nineteenth century produced a major vector in world economic devel-
opment (see, e.g., Tugan-Baranovsky 2008 [1913]; Mendelson 1959, vol. 2; Trakhtenberg 
1963; Lan 1975). Large-scale investments of British capital in the railway construction in 
the United States, Australia, India, etc. contributed to stagnation within the World System 
hegemon (and, finally, the change of the center of this hegemony). Technological changes 
that start in one zone of the World System after their diffusion to other zones may produce 
such consequences that could hardly be forecasted. Thus, the development of oceanic and 
railway transportation led to vigorous exportation of cereal crops from the USA, Russia, 
and Canada that caused in the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s the so-called world agrarian crisis 
(which affected significantly the 2nd K-wave downswing but helped several countries to 
escape from the Malthusian trap [see, e.g., Grinin, Korotayev, and Malkov 2010]).  
5. Important events that take place within the World System sooner or later can lead to 
a switch from downswing to upswing (or, naturally, from upswing to downswing) within 
K-wave dynamics. As is well-known, the discovery of gold in California and Australia 
contributed in a rather significant way to the world economic (and price) growth during 
the 2nd K-wave upswing, which was already noticed by Kondratieff (Kondratieff 2002: 
384–385).  
Change of K-Wave Phases against the Background  
of the Interaction between the World-System Core and  
Periphery  
Core and Periphery. We contend that the change of K-wave upswing and downswing 
phases correlates significantly with the phases of fluctuations in the relationships between 
the World System Core and Periphery, as well as with World System Core changes  
(the growth or decline of its strength, emergence of competing centers, their movements, 
and so on). Below we present our ideas on the possible causes of such a correlation. How-
ever, it turns out necessary to study the following questions: does this correlation emerge as 
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a result of the casual link between the two processes? Is it caused by some other processes? 
Is not the causation pattern here even more complex? In any case this correlation appears 
especially important, as in the recent years one can observe an evident change in the inter-
action between the Core and Periphery of the World System. In particular, the World-
System Periphery (in contrast with what was observed not so long ago) tends to develop 
more rapidly than the core (see, e.g., Korotayev et al. 2011; Khaltourina and Korotayev 
2010; Korotayev, Khaltourina, Malkov et al. 2010; Malkov et al. 2010; Grinin and Koro-
tayev 2009b, 2010). This has become especially salient during the current global economic 
crisis. 
Thus, what is the correlation between structural changes of the World System and peri-
odic fluctuations within the K-wave dynamics?  
We suggest that during the K-wave downswings the Core tends to subjugate, integrate, 
and pull up the Periphery to a greater extent than it is observed during the K-wave up-
swings. It is during the K-wave downswings that the Core tends to expand vigorously (in 
various way) to the Periphery by investing resources into the latter and by actively modern-
izing it. Those efforts and resource flows contribute to the slow-down of the Core growth 
rates.  
In contrast, during K-wave upswings the Core's activities are concentrated within the 
core part of the World System; in the meantime the balance of resource movement turns out 
to be in favor of the Core. Such a situation leads to the acceleration of growth rates of the 
Core countries (note, however, that this situation was not observed during the most recent 
[5th K-wave] upswing).  
The resource flow from the World-System Core to the Semiperiphery and Periphery 
may proceed in various forms (military expenditures, FDI, aid, emigration, and so on). Of 
course, such actions were usually undertaken by the Core countries in order to obtain cer-
tain concrete gains: to get colonies, to obtain profits, to get influence in certain countries, 
to open markets, to get access to raw materials and so on (though the philanthropic com-
ponent tended to become more and more pronounced with the course of time). However, it 
takes any long-term investments a long time to pay for themselves (and sometimes they do 
not – especially when they are made by politicians rather than businessmen). Often such 
a resource flow proceeded in the form of loans many of which were never paid back.  
The resource flow to the Core could be also achieved in various forms – ranging from 
a direct plunder of colonies to importing very cheap commodities from them; it was also 
achieved through monopoly prices, unfair loans, and so on. The 2nd K-wave upswing (the 
late 1840s to the 1870s) was supported to a very considerable extent by the flow of gold 
from such peripheral areas as California and Australia. In recent years one could observe 
certain exportation of capitals from the Periphery and Semiperiphery to the Core, as has been 
observed for China, Brazil, and Russia as regards the U.S. securities; one may also note 
cheap Chinese exports, brain drain from India, etc.  
Let us study how this works with respect to particular K-waves and their phases.  
The First Wave: The Late 1780s / Early 1790s – 1844/1851 
Phase A: the late 1780s / early 1790s – 1810/1817. By that period the main colonial con-
quests of the pre-industrial epoch had been already finished, the independence wars of the 
New World colonies began, and the main interests of the European powers were focused on 
internal affairs. In this period the resource flow from the Core to the Periphery was rather 
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insignificant, whereas the one from the Periphery to the Core remained quite substantial.  
The Periphery and Semiperiphery (the USA in the first place) acted as suppliers of raw mate-
rials (cotton) for the development of the most advanced industrial sectors (Burstin 1993a, 
1993b; Sevostyanov 1983; DiBacco et al.1992; Zinn 1995).  
Phase B (downswing): 1810/1817–1844/1851. Europe (primarily Britain and France) 
engaged in rather active expansion on the Periphery – China, Algeria, Egypt, Turkey, and 
Latin America. British loans and investments went to Latin America and the USA (Tugan-
Baranovsky 2008 [1913]; Mendelson 1959). There was a massive emigration from Europe 
(and especially Britain) to the West European offshoots; one could observe the active 
opening of Australia (e.g., Malakhovski 1971), the South and the West of the USA. In this 
period resources moved from Britain rather than to Britain. This partly accounts for rela-
tively bad conditions of the working class in Britain at this time (vividly described by 
Engels 2009 [1845]).  
The Second Wave: 1844/1851–1890/1896  
Phase A: 1844/1851–1870/1875. Europe again concentrated on its internal affairs (includ-
ing the Crimean War, the unification of Germany and Italy and so on). The USA was tied 
by internal struggles, and Russia was focused on internal reforms. A free trade system is 
established (e.g., Held et al. 1999). The flow of Australian and Californian gold reached 
Europe; one could observe a rather active catch-up of the European Semiperiphery (Grinin 
and Korotayev 2009b).  
Phase B: 1870/1875–1890/1896. Europe actively expanded to the Periphery, actually 
the world was mostly divided between the Core powers that accomplish the final wave of 
colonial conquests (this involves some semiperipheral countries, first of all Russia con-
quered most part of Central Asia). One could observe an active opening of agricultural 
lands in the American West (Burstin 1993a, 1993b; Sevostyanov 1983; DiBacco, Mason, 
and Appy 1992; Zinn 1995) and a very rapid development of Australia (e.g., Malakhovski 
1971), as well as significant investments in the Periphery (especially in the railroad con-
struction). Actually, during this period resources moved rather actively from Britain and 
some other European countries to the Periphery – for example, as loans for Latin America 
(e.g., Tugan-Baranovsky 2008 [1913]; Mendelson 1959).  
The Third Wave: 1890/1896–1945  
Phase A: 1890/1896–1914/1928. Europe is concentrated on internal competition within 
itself (resulting finally in an outright warfare), the USA is also concentrated on its own 
internal affairs (with the exception of a war with Spain); the preparations for the war and 
competition between Germany and Britain stimulate the technological race and economic 
growth (e.g., Grenville 1999). One could observe a significant flow of resources from the 
Periphery, as well as the start of the transition of the World System hegemony to the USA 
that, however, continued to be an importer of capital for a long time (e.g., Lan 1975). Re-
sources also flowed actively to Russia, Japan and some other semiperipheral countries where 
investors could find opportunities to introduce new technologies and get high profits. 
Phase B: 1914/1928–1939/1950. Activation of the Periphery and Semiperiphery, its 
struggle with the Core in various forms (India, China, Egypt, the USSR, Japan, etc.),  
the finalizing of the transition of the World System hegemony from Europe to the USA 
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(see, e.g., Modelski and Thompson 1996; Grinin and Korotayev 2009b; Lan 1976).  
The continuation of the Core countries control over their colonies requires more and more 
efforts and expenses. 
The Fourth Wave: 1939/1950–1984/1991  
Phase A: 1939/1950–1968/1974. The Core lost direct political control over the Periphery 
and was concentrated on its own internal affairs (including the West European integration); 
as a result of this concentration and the redistribution of capitals and technologies within the 
World-System Core one could observe the Japanese, German, Italian, and Spanish economic 
miracles, as well as the consolidation of the Western world under the US hegemony (e.g., 
Lan 1978); one could also observe the emergence of new centers of development, including 
the Eastern Block and Japan (e.g., Popov 1978). 
Phase B: 1968/1974–1984/1991. The Periphery ‘attacked’ the Core in terms of 
economy – first of all through a radical increase in oil and some other raw material pric-
es. In the meantime the West invests rather actively in the Periphery (especially, through 
loans to the developing countries). 
The Fifth Wave: 1984/1991–2015/20 (?)  
Phase A: 1984/1991–2001/2007. This phase displays certain peculiarities in comparison 
with previous upswings, as during this period the main economic growth was generated 
not by the Core, but rather by the Periphery whose strongest countries moved to the Semi-
periphery and even became new centers of growth.7 Many Core countries (especially in 
Europe) were concentrated on their internal affairs. In the meantime one could observe a 
rather active exchange of resources between the Core and the Periphery. On the one hand, 
industrial production moved from the Core to the Periphery; on the other hand, one can 
observe a vigorous flow of cheap manufactured products from the Periphery to the Core, 
whereas the Western countries became financial net importers (especially, through the 
movement of petrodollars). The USA actively exchanged ‘paper’ dollars for manufactured 
goods from the periphery, which contributed to the explosive growth of the US public debt 
(see, e.g., Akaev, Korotayev, and Fomin 2012). One may also take into account the Pe-
riphery – Core labor migration. Thus, at the first glance the balance of exchange looked as 
if being in favor of the Core. On the other hand, one should take into account the fact that 
those processes were accompanied by the acceleration of the economic growth in the Pe-
riphery and its slowdown in the Core – so, actually the Periphery favored from them more 
than the Core. One may suppose that this was supported by a substantial transformation of 
national sovereignty that opened borders for the flows of foreign capitals and technologies 
(see Grinin 2005, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d; Grinin and Korotayev 2009a, 2009b, 2010; 
see Grinin 2008e, 2008f, 2009b on the processes of decrease of sovereignty prerogatives).  
Phase B: 2001/2007–2015/2020. By now we observe the weakening of the Core and the 
activation of new centers; one may expect a search for a new balance of power and new coa-
litions (see Grinin 2009a, 2010, 2011; Grinin and Korotayev 2010 for more details). 
Now let us consider some characteristics and causes of those processes. 
                                                          
7 This somehow resembles the situation during the 3rd K-wave upswing, when the growth was generated in still semi-
peripheral Germany, the USA, and Russia, rather than in still hegemonic Britain.  
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Possible causes of the expansion. It is natural to suppose that particular strong Juglar 
crises and depressions typical for K-wave downswings in the Core countries stimulate the 
Core expansion on the Periphery.8 Such an expansion can be considered a result (and as 
a part) of counter-crisis measures undertaken by the Core countries. In addition, one may 
take into account the imitation competition effect – the intensification of expansion efforts 
by one state tend to provoke such an intensification on the part of competing states.  
In what way does the expansion contribute to the additional slow-down of the eco-
nomic development during the downswing?  
1. In the course of such an expansion the energy of the Core tended to become ex-
hausted.  
2. In addition, the Core powers could be exhausted by their struggles over their control 
over the World System Periphery. In any case the growth of this control involved substan-
tial expenses (and sometimes serious destruction). In the previous periods this could addi-
tionally weaken the Periphery. On the other hand, results of mutually beneficial expansion 
may be felt with a substantial lag.  
3. On the other hand, the fast development was often hindered by the insufficient con-
gruence of the economic structures of the Core and Periphery, a huge gap in the levels of 
economic development that was observed in many cases.  
4. One cannot exclude that we deal here with a sort of positive feedback: the worsen-
ing of the economic situation in the Core stimulated its expansion to the Periphery, where-
as the growing expenses to support this expansion may have worsened the situation in the 
Core. 
5. As a result of the active integration of the Periphery into the World System, the 
transformation of the Hinterland into Periphery, a part of the Periphery into Semiperiph-
ery, and the formation of new centers in the Semiperiphery the World System expanded, 
the number of links and contact intensity within it increased explosively, etc.; this, how-
ever, led to a certain slowdown of the World System economic growth.  
6. Downswings are also connected with the weakening of the old Hegemon. This 
weakens the structural congruence of the World System and supports the trend toward the 
slowdown of the economic growth rates. We are likely to observe such a pattern in  
the forthcoming years. On the other hand, it appears virtually impossible to replace the 
USA as the Word System Hegemon, because the USA is a multifunctional Hegemon, 
whereas no other power will be able to play such a role in the forthcoming decades. That is 
why there are grounds to expect the reconfiguration of the World System as a whole (see 
Grinin 2009а, 2010; Grinin and Korotayev 2010 for more details).  
Slowdowns of the world economic growth are often connected with the slowdown of 
the economic growth of the Hegemon.  
During upswings the resource movement balance tends to be in favor of the Core.  
1. During the upswing, the World System Core tends to concentrate on its internal af-
fairs (including the struggles between the Core countries), and consequently it tends to 
move less resources to the Periphery.  
                                                          
8 On the other hand, the weakening of the Core makes it possible for the Periphery to undertake counter-expansion, as 
was observed in the 1970s and early 1980s as regards fuel prices. Their explosive growth led to the flow of resources 
from the Core to the Periphery.  
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2. Resource accumulation, restructuring of relationships within the core, as well as the 
emergence of new (and especially military) technologies stimulate the escalation of hege-
monic struggles within the Core.  
3. By themselves those struggles and wars contribute to the acceleration of both infla-
tion and economic growth (thus, we are dealing here with a certain positive feedback). 
4. An important factor of the change of the resource movement balance in favor of the 
Core was constituted by the fact that the previous investment started to produce returns; in 
particular, the long-term investments in the infrastructure started to produce results;  
the trade-financial links started to work, scarcely populated territories were peopled (as 
was observed, e.g., in Australia in the first half of the nineteenth century), and so on. 
5. On the other hand, new peripheral regions were involved in global trade. Those re-
gions in order to do this often had to export their commodities with reduced prices (which 
often implied non-equivalent exchange – see Grinin and Korotayev 2012 for more  
details).9  
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Appendix 
Supplementary Figures 
Fig. S1. Dynamics of Proportion of Investments in the World GDP (%), 1965–2005  
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Fig. S2. Dynamics of the World Investment Effectiveness, 1965–2005  
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Note: This variable indicates how many dollars of the world GDP growth are achieved with one dollar of 
investments.  
                                                          
10 Dynamics of this variable has been calculated by Justislav Bogevolnov (Moscow State University, Department of 
Global Studies) with the World Bank database by dividing the world gross fixed capital formation indicator (in con-
stant international 2000 dollars) for a given year by the world GDP (in constant international 2000 dollars) for the 
same year.  
11 Dynamics of this variable has been calculated by Justislav Bogevolnov.  
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